At the very moment CAPPS II as we know it appears to have been discredited, the Bush Administration this month unveiled plans to begin testing in June a registered traveler program
(see story). The move is perplexing, to say the least.
Evidently, the Transportation Security Administration believes business travelers will pay a fee and turn over personal data for background checks in order to be biometrically scanned and avoid the small number of random occasions in which they are detained for secondary screening—the wand-waving, shoe- and bag-checking that most frequent travelers have experienced.
Testing a registered traveler program should not be a priority at a time when the hassle factor is down and the need for thorough aviation security remains critical in light of ongoing terrorist threats.
TSA said it's up to 15 percent, but let's assume that there are some travelers who, under existing procedures, are put through secondary screening all the time—say, because they are of Arab descent. Even those passengers, as registered travelers, only would be avoiding the three-to-five-minute experience that is the consequence of being a secondary-screening selectee, according to a TSA spokesperson. TSA has not said whether such trusted travelers would continue to wait in the initial metal detector line with the rest of us, or would get their own lines.
Giving TSA the benefit of the doubt, since it has yet to formalize its plan, June seems awfully soon to be testing something whose plan is not yet formalized—particularly something as sensitive as this and that comes with so many unanswered questions. Before such a test, Business Travel News would like to see evidence that TSA has addressed concerns previously voiced by its first administrator and Congress' General Accounting Office.
The primary concern of former TSA chief John Magaw was that the concept could register travelers who are members of terrorist "sleeper cells," easing their access to the aircraft. GAO echoed that issue in 2002.
According to a September 2003 GAO report, "Key policy and implementation issues that would need to be resolved before a registered traveler program could be implemented include the criteria that should be established to determine eligibility to apply for the program; kinds of background checks that should be used to certify applicants' eligibility to enroll in the program and the entity who should perform these checks; security-screening procedures that registered travelers should undergo and the differences between these procedures and those for unregistered travelers; and concerns that the traveling public or others may have about equity, privacy and liability."
Still other questions remain.
What technology would be used to verify participants' identities? A bevy of differing protocols for similar systems underway in isolated pockets of the global air transport system is begging for standardization to keeps costs down.
What would be the cost of such a system and who would cover it? The Air Transport Association in 2002 attributed an estimated $3.8 billion in lost annual airline industry revenues to the "hassle factor," but while TSA keeps no averages on wait times, U.S. Department of Homeland Security officials, including Admiral James Loy and Tom Ridge, said they have fallen.
Released last month, the J.D. Power and Associates 2003 Global Airport Passenger Satisfaction Study of more than 12,000 passengers concluded that overall wait times at security checkpoints decreased on average 14 percent, to 13 minutes in 2003, from 15 minutes in 2002
(see story).Even if secondary screenings are enough to deter business travel, it's not up to business travel to save the airlines. Nor is the health of the business travel industry a proper measure of aviation safety.
Other questions include whether companies would get involved in helping their travelers qualify for the registered traveler program. Could that—or their reimbursement of the fee travelers would pay—come with any sort of liability? Also, how many participants should be allowed? Is the primary purpose of such a class system to provide perks or to improve homeland and transportation security?
TSA has claimed a handful of achievements in the aviation safety aspect of the fight against terrorism. By April of last year, cockpit doors in 10,000 aircraft were hardened and newer metal detectors were installed in all domestic airports; all checked luggage now is screened for explosives, in contrast with the rate of 5 percent before 9/11; and thousands of air marshals fly on tens of thousands of flights per month, versus just 33 on mostly international flights before. While these and other accomplished steps do not encompass all that must be done to ensure safer skies, TSA's latest initiatives on passenger screening raise the question of whether the Administration is running out of ideas.
Calls for this program from airlines, business travel associations and some travel buyers appear misguided in that it will offer individuals little relief from hassle in exchange for their privacy, funding and reduced security. While there is a clear need to relieve from harassment law-abiding travelers with names or appearances similar to known and suspected terrorists, the idea of registering to travel in this country is repugnant to those of us who strive to continue living in the land of the free.
In late 2002, GAO reported that, regarding registered traveler, TSA "affirmed that there are no easy answers to some of the issues that GAO raised and that these issues need more study." In lieu of such research and an opportunity for public comment, the priority for TSA should remain providing thorough security that gets all travelers through the process as quickly as possible, not in creating loopholes at the airport.